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One of the clearest examples showing that classical physics is but a limited
case of relativity physics is the history of Newton's famous "bucket experiment."
The classicists, such as Newton, the positivists, such as Mach, and the twentieth-
century relativity physicists have all referred to this example in defending their
conceptions of space. Not only do the various physicists use this example in their
discussions of the nature of space, but the current status of discussion about
the pail shows that the absolute character of space is still held, although with
modifications. The purpose of this paper is to state the history of the discussion
concerning the bucket experiment (which is actually just an illustration) intending
to show that there are still senses in which space is considered absolute.
Newton conceived space to be absolute and claimed to have proof of its absolute
nature. He maintained that absolute space is a great void which objects occupy.
It exists independently of objects, and if there were no objects, then space would
still exist. Thus, this space has a character independent of objects, one of which,
as we shall presently see, is to affect objects. Newton's oftquoted definition of
space is that absolute space is its own nature, without relation to anything external,
remains always similar and immovable; i.e., that absolute space is always the
same, related to nothing, and immovable. Newton also recognized relative
space which changes, related to objects, and moves within absolute space. That
there are relative spaces can be determined, he maintained, through a study of
translatory motion; while the determination of the existence of absolute space
involves inferences based upon a study of rotational motion. One can more
clearly grasp the nature of Newtonian absolute space by contrasting it with the
relative space of Leibniz.
Leibniz opposed the Newtonian position by contending that space is the
observed relation of coexistent phenomena. Space is not a substance, but an
idea derived from a series of observations of groups of fixed existents (called
places) taken together. If there were no objects then there would be no space—just the opposite of Newton. Leibniz endeavoured to disprove Newton's position
with his famous principle of the identity of the indiscernables, one part of which
can be stated as ". . . if there is no method of distinguishing between what are
two distinct states of affairs, then there is in fact only one state." He used this
to reply to an argument by Clark, a Newtonian disciple, who contended that the
whole universe might be moved in absolute space. Leibniz said that it would
be impossible to distinguish between the positions of a group of bodies in two
different parts of absolute space. And if this indiscernability is an actuality,
then there is no reason to contend that a change from one part of space to another
has taken place. Newton's absolute space is a meaningless concept. Hence,
space presupposes the existence of objects. I conclude from Leibniz's discussion
that there is no doubt but that Clark-Newton would have been thoroughly ploughed
had their argument rested upon translational motion; Newton, however, relied
upon rotational motion to prove his point.
The following is Newton's argument for absolute motion. This is referred to
as the "pail experiment":
If a vessel, hung by a long cord, is so often turned about that the cord is strongly
twisted, then filled with water, and held at rest together with the water, thereupon,
by the sudden action of another force, it is whirled about the contrary way, and
while the cord is untwisting itself, the vessel, by gradually communicating its motion
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to the water, will make it begin sensibly to revolve, and recede by little and little
from the middle, and ascend to the sides of the vessel, forming itself into a concave
figure, and the swifter the motion becomes, the higher the water will rise, till at
last, performing its revolutions at the same times with the vessel, it becomes rela-
tively at rest with it. This ascent of the water shows its endeavor to recede from
the axis of motion, and the true and absolute circular motion of the water, which
here is directly contrary to the relative, becomes known and may be measured by
this endeavor. . . . And therefore this endeavor does not depend upon any transla-
tion of the water in respect of the ambient bodies, nor can true circular motion be
defined by such translation (Cajori, 1934).
The following diagram will make this clearer:
Consider three glass pails:
area
FIGURE 1. G—velocity of the glass. W—velocity of the water. K—constant.
A B C
Glass in motion;




G - W = 0
Glass not in motion;
Water in motion
W - G = K
Here Newton maintained that if all motions were relative, then there should be
no difference between the situation in A and in C, but obviously there is a difference,
viz., in the water level, which is due to centrifugal force. Newton says that this
is due to rotation in absolute space. Absolute space acts upon the bodies within
it, for how else is one to account for the difference of water states? Some critics
of Leibniz (Jammer, 1954) have noted that he never successfully answered this
particular argument although he tried to do so. It is felt that for this reason
Newton, rather than Leibniz, became accepted on this point until the time of Mach.
The main critic of Newton's argument for absolute space, in the period just
before Einstein stated his General Theory of Relativity, was Mach. He attempted
to prove that it was not necessary to assume absolute space to account for centri-
fugal forces in rotational motion:
Newton's experiment with the rotation vessel of water simply informs us that the
relative motion of the water with respect to the sides of the vessel produces no
noticeable centrifugal forces, but that such forces are produced by its relative rota-
tion with respect to the mass of the earth and other celestial bodies (Mach, 1902).
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"Newton," says Mach, "must be able to prove his argument would be sound under
the condition that space were absolutely empty. As such a condition is impossible
to experience, Newton's argument is not empirically based . . . hence not
scientific." "Furthermore," Mach contends, "Newton holds to a contradiction,
viz., a space which acts, but cannot be acted upon." Mach, however, was unable
to give a quantative explanation of these centrifugal forces, and so his position
remained unaccepted.
Einstein, differing from Mach, gave greater significance to the famous bucket
experiment:
(Newton) had recognized that the observable geometrical magnitudes (distance of
material points from one another) and their change in the process of time to not
completely determine movements in a physical sense. He shows this in the famous
bucket experiment . . . He recognized that space must possess a sort of physical
reality if his laws of motion are to have a meaning, a reality of the same sort as the
material points and their distances (Einstein, 1927).
Einstein held that space did possess a sort of physical reality, and thereby he can
be said to have given "absolute space" meaning. His finite and unbounded
universe consists of objects and their gravitational fields. The stars and their
gravitational fields provide the shape of the universe, and their directions provide
the axes of an inertia frame with respect to which absolute rotation can be measured.
Thus, ". . . absolute space and time are restored to the universe as a whole"
(Whetrow, 1959). It is certainly true that absolute space here means something
different than the meaning given by Newton, but note that Einstein himself
attributes to space-time an absolute nature:
Just as it was consistent from the Newtonian standpoint to make both the statements,
tempus est absolutum, spatium est absolutum, so from the standpoint of the special
theory of relativity we must say, continuum spatii et temporis est absolutum. In this
statement absolutum means not only physical real, but also independent in its physical
properties having a physical effect (Einstein, 1955).
Einstein's space-time finite and unbounded universe has just such physical
properties. And it is my point to show that there is a significance sense in which
Einsteinian space-time is said to be absolute.
There is still another philosopher-scientist, d'Abro, who gave significance to
the bucket experiment, and who contends that the experiment plus the results of
the relativity theories, as well as the speculations by Abbe LeMaitre about the
universe, give rise to still another conception of absolute space:
Physical experiments had established the identity of two types of masses, the inertia
and the gravitational. Hence the forces of inertia and gravitation should be essenti-
ally the same. But there is a marked difference between the distribution of forces
of inertia and those of gravitation. Forces of inertia can be cancelled by the observer
changing his motion. We cannot permanently get rid of the force of gravitation.
. . . It follows that the non-Euclideanism of space, present in a gravitational field,
must come from a deeper source. In particular, it must arise from an intrinsic non-
Euclideanism in space-time which surrounds matter since it is only a curved non-
Euclidean space-time that can never be split up into flat space and flat time. Matter
. . . causes space-time to become curved. . . . Space-time is primarily an absolute
four dimensional continuum of events. When devoid of matter and energy its
structure is flat. When matter is present, the flat structure yields gently both around
matter and in its interior. . . . (For Mach to have been correct) matter would have
to create space-time and its structure . . . not merely modify a locally preexisting
structure (d'Abro, 1950).
This concept of space-time is in sharp contrast to Einstein's, as in the latter space
would be nonexistent if there were no matter. d'Abro maintains that space-time
has a character independent of matter; i.e., it is affected by matter but not deter-
mined by it. This space-time is referred to as being "quasi-Euclidean" by d'Abro
and Lemaitre. And Einstein, himself, says:
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If the universe were quasi-Euclidean, then Mach was wholly wrong in his thought that
inertia, as well as gravitation, depends upon a kind of mutual action between bodies
(Einstein, 1955).
It is true that when Einstein wrote this statement he did not believe the universe
to be quasi-Euclidean, but ten years later in 1932 he stated that his objections in
the above work ". . . to a world model of finite density in Euclidean space no
longer applied if space could be considered as expanding" (Whitrow, 1959). And
it is just on this basis that d'Abro believes his space-time theory is more adequate
than Einstein's. d'Abro contends that Lemaitre's expanding universe theory is
more adequate than the finite and unbounded world model. Lemaitre asserts
that there is a nucleus of matter expanding in an infinite universe. Such a universe
would be Euclidean because it is infinite and independent of matter, but only
quasi-Euclidean because it is affected by the matter in it. This latter point brings
out the fact that d'Abro bases his views upon the General Relativity theory.
There are many world models that are so based, and there are many that are not.
The Lemaitre model is not as universally accepted as d'Abro implies. That
space-time is, however, independent of matter is held by d'Abro and many others
and in this sense is absolute.
The purpose of this paper is to bring out the various senses in which space was
and is held to be absolute. Newton held that absolute space was independent of
matter but affected it, as evidenced by the pail experiment. Einstein held to an
absolute space-time, although it is dependent upon the existence of matter and its
fields. d'Abro holds that space-time was absolute in being independent of matter
but affected by it. Thus, the concept of absolute space is not a discarded one.
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